The Many Mendelsohn ‘Me Too’ Missteps:  An Alliterative Response to Professor Rubenstein by Secunda, Paul M.
Marquette University Law School
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2008
The Many Mendelsohn ‘Me Too’ Missteps: An
Alliterative Response to Professor Rubenstein
Paul M. Secunda
Marquette University Law School, paul.secunda@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Paul. M. Secunda, The Many Mendelsohn ‘Me Too’ Missteps: An Alliterative Response to Professor
Rubenstein, 102 Nw. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 374 (2008). “Reprinted by special permission of
Northwestern University School of Law, Northwestern University Law Review.”
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Secunda, Paul M., "The Many Mendelsohn ‘Me Too’ Missteps: An Alliterative Response to Professor Rubenstein" (2008). Faculty
Publications. Paper 100.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/100
Copyright  2008  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Vol.  102 
Northwestern  University  Law  Review  Colloquy 
 
 
 
 
374 
THE MANY MENDELSOHN “ME TOO” MISSTEPS: AN 
ALLITERATIVE RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR 
RUBINSTEIN 
By Paul M. Secunda* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although one might have the impression that the missteps referred to 
in the title of this paper indicate a criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ADEA1 decision of Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn,2 it does 
not.  I believe the unanimous Court opinion is correct: “Me too” evidence 
should be admissible in certain instances based on evidentiary principles 
and based on the overriding importance of context in such cases, as further 
discussed in Professor Mitchell Rubinstein’s Colloquy Essay.3 
Rather, the missteps I have in mind are: (1) my own misstep for writ-
ing in a previous Workplace Prof Blog post, before the decision, that a per 
se rule against this type of evidence would be adopted by the usual conser-
vative Supreme Court Justice suspects;4 (2) the misstep made by the Su-
preme Court for granting certiorari in this rather mundane (legally 
speaking) employment discrimination case; and (3) the misstep of Professor 
Rubinstein in suggesting that the decision in Mendelsohn will provide “im-
portant medicine” for employment discrimination plaintiffs5 and in conclud-
 
*
  Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School; Immediate Past Chair, Employment Dis-
crimination Section, Association of American Law Schools; Co-editor, Workplace Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog (link). I would like to thank Charlie Craver, Joel Fried-
man, Jeff Hirsch, Nancy Levit, Marcia McCormick, Paul Mollica, Mike Selmi, Charlie Sullivan, and 
Mike Zimmer, for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. 
1
  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)–(b) (2000) (link). 
2
  128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008) (link). 
3
  Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn: The Supreme Court Ap-
pears to Have Punted on the Admissibility of “Me Too” Evidence of Discrimination. But Did It?, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 264 (2008), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/11/LRColl2008n11Rubinstein.pdf (link). 
4
  Posting of Paul M. Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2007/06/supremes_take_m.html (June 11, 2007) [here-
inafter Posting of Paul M. Secunda (June 11, 2007)] (link). 
5
  Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 273. 
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ing that this “me too” issue may again raise its narcissistic head before the 
Court.6 
Before considering these missteps, it is first important to briefly ob-
serve that Mendelsohn does present a common recurring question of proof 
in employment discrimination cases: whether a district court should admit 
“me too” evidence offered by either plaintiff or defendant.7  “Me too” evi-
dence is testimony by non-parties alleging discrimination at the hands of 
persons who played little to no role in the adverse employment decision be-
ing challenged by the plaintiff.8  A split panel of the Tenth Circuit in Men-
delsohn held that a court commits reversible error by adopting a blanket 
rule to always exclude “me too” evidence 9  
I. MEA CULPA ON ME TOO 
Initially, the Mendelsohn decision appeared significant for future em-
ployment-discrimination litigation because it promised to tilt the balance in 
the evidentiary fray between plaintiffs and defendants, either potentially es-
tablishing a blanket rule of admitting (favoring plaintiffs) or barring (favor-
ing defendants) such evidence.10  Indeed, this was my misstep in believing 
that this common reduction-in-force (RIF) case, involving a claim that an 
employer used workforce reductions to weed out older employees in viola-
tion of the ADEA, would have momentous implications.11 
The Tenth Circuit majority maintained that since Sprint terminated 
Mendelsohn under a company-wide RIF, it should not matter whether she 
was terminated by the same supervisor who made the inculpatory statement 
at issue because such testimony helped to establish a discriminatory atmos-
phere.12  In this vein, the majority opinion concluded that “[a]ge as a moti-
vation for Sprint’s selection of Mendelsohn to the RIF becomes more 
probable when the fact-finder is allowed to consider evidence of (1) an at-
mosphere of age discrimination, and (2) Sprint’s selection of other older 
employees to the RIF.”13 
 
6
  See id. at 275 (“[B]ecause the Court did not definitively resolve the issue, there likely will be addi-
tional litigation until the Supreme Court resolves it once and for all.”). 
7
  See Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1143. 
8
  See id. 
9
  Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2006). 
10
  Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Takes On “Me, Too” Age Bias, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 26, 2007, at 1 
(quoting this author as stating, “There is potentially a big impact” because “[t]he decision may apply 
equally to the Americans With Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; race discrimi-
nation claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981; and certain parts of the Family and Medical Leave Act.”). 
11
  See Posting of Paul M. Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2007/12/oral-argument-t.html (Dec. 3, 2007) [herein-
after Posting of Paul M. Secunda (Dec. 3, 2007)] (“[A] lot is at stake in this ADEA case.”) (link); see 
also Posting of Paul M. Secunda (June 11, 2007), supra note 4 (“The Supreme Court has decided to 
weigh in on another important issue under employment discrimination law.”). 
12
  Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1230. 
13
  Id. 
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Professor Rubinstein’s Essay expresses a continued belief that Mendel-
sohn will be an important case going forward for employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs.  I, on the other hand, have now come to see the error of my 
way: My mistake was in viewing this case not as one of employment dis-
crimination law, but as one of evidentiary law.14  My early impression, 
based on an alternative theory offered by Judge Tymkovich’s dissent, was 
that a conservative majority of Supreme Court justices would find that “tes-
timony from other employees not similarly situated is [not] admissible . . . 
where the plaintiff has made no independent showing of a company-wide 
policy of discrimination.”15  I wrongly believed that the Supreme Court ma-
jority would focus on the phrase “independent showing” in this language 
and require employment discrimination plaintiffs going forward to make a 
showing of a discriminatory employment atmosphere not only beyond the 
testimony of the plaintiff but even beyond the proposed evidence from co-
workers that a plaintiff sought to have admitted into evidence.  But I missed 
the forest for the trees. 
The forest in Mendelsohn is the underlying principle that it is for the 
trial court, absent unusual circumstances, to decide basic evidentiary issues 
of relevancy and probative value.16  In fact, I agree wholeheartedly with 
Professor Rubinstein that context is everything in these cases.17  The impor-
tance of context explains why a bright-line rule was never to be adopted re-
garding “me too” evidence and why it is also highly unlikely that “me too” 
evidence will again visit the Supreme Court.18 
In all, I focused on the right judge on the Tenth Circuit, but on the 
wrong theory advanced by that judge.  Before even discussing the idea of 
an “independent showing” in his dissent, Judge Tymkovich came to an even 
more sensible threshold conclusion: “I do not believe the district court 
abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings excluding testimony.”19  Fed-
 
14
  Interestingly, unlike other employment discrimination/evidence cases like Texas Department of 
Community Affairs  v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), Mendelsohn does not include any meaningful dis-
cussion of the employment discrimination context. 
15
  Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1231 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
16
  “An appellate court should not presume that a district court intended an incorrect legal result 
when the order is equally susceptible of a correct reading, particularly when the applicable standard of 
review is deferential.”  Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140, 1146 (2008).  The 
trees in my metaphor refer to arguments surrounding whether “me too” evidence should be admitted in 
employment discrimination cases. 
17
  See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 266 & n.12 (citing Ash v. Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454, 455 
(2006) (per curiam) for the proposition that, “context almost always matters when interpreting witness 
statements”). 
18
  Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1145 (“A district court is accorded a wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules.  Assessing the probative value of [the proffered evi-
dence], and weighing any factors counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the district court’s 
sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 . . . .”) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 
(1984)). 
19
  Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1231 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
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eral Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 403 directs federal courts to exclude other-
wise relevant evidence under F.R.E. 401,20 “if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”21  Significantly, decisions 
to exclude evidence on this basis by trial courts are traditionally given great 
deference by reviewing appellate courts, and Mendelsohn upheld that prin-
ciple.22  Perhaps more importantly, by its very nature, Rule 403 requires the 
balancing of relevancy and prejudice by a judge and is therefore not suscep-
tible to bright-line rules being hoisted upon it.23 
II. MENDING MENDELSOHN 
If Judge Tymkovich could have found, perhaps on a differently consti-
tuted panel, a colleague who would have voted with him, or had there been 
a successful petition for rehearing en banc, the evidentiary ruling of the trial 
court might have been affirmed and that would have ended the case.  But, of 
course, the Tenth Circuit majority instead decided to, in essence, weigh the 
probative value and prejudice effect of the “me too” evidence itself, and for 
the reasons already described, concluded that the evidence should be admit-
ted.24  Although rank speculation, the best guess for the reason the case was 
granted certiorari was that the lack of deference to the evidentiary rulings of 
the trial court got the attention of at least four Supreme Court Justices.25 
This, of course, brings us to the second Mendelsohn misstep: why did 
the Supreme Court believe this rather ordinary evidentiary ruling required 
high court review?  I guess it is conceivable that the Court was so flabber-
 
20
  FED. R. EVID. § 401. 
21
  FED. R. EVID. § 403. 
22
  Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. at 1145 (noting that there is broad discretion granted to a district court’s 
evidentiary rulings); see also Reyna v. City of Portland, No. 05-36063, 2008 WL 755497, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 20, 2008) (“The Supreme Court has directed that we afford broad discretion to a district court’s 
evidentiary rulings.”) (citing Mendelsohn 128 S. Ct. at 1144–45).  But see Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 
U.S. 440 (2000) (upholding direction of verdict of appellate court after holding plaintiff’s expert testi-
mony inadmissible and finding the properly admitted evidence insufficient to support the verdict.).  It is 
unlikely, however, that a single piece of wrongly admitted “me too” evidence would decisively change a 
verdict.  See id. at 452–53 n.9 (“Many rulings on evidence, of course, do not bear dispositively on the 
adequacy of the proof to support a verdict.  For example, . . . the evidence may abundantly support a 
jury’s verdict, but one or another item may have been unduly prejudicial to the verdict loser and exclud-
able on that account.”) (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).   
23
  See, e.g., Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier with the 
Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of Evidence, 32 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 915, 925 (1990) (“Rule 403 is a broad rule which recognizes the large discretionary role of the 
judge in controlling the introduction of evidence.  Tailoring such a broad rule to a specific form of evi-
dence creates problems.”) (citing J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 403[01], at 
403–09 (1990)). 
24
  Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006).  
25
  Alternatively, other possible reason for granting review include establishing a bar for “me too” 
evidence in future employment discrimination cases or addressing concerns of judicial management. 
102:374  (2008) The Many Mendelsohn “Me Too” Missteps 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/19/ 378 
gasted by the Tenth Circuit’s decision that it had to right the wrong and 
place evidentiary discretion back where it belonged.  But this is a Court that 
does not lightly grant certiorari.26  My guess is that a group of conservative 
justices thought Mendelsohn might provide an opportunity to set up a 
bright-line rule that “me too” evidence is per se irrelevant under Rule 401 
and that they could once and for all rid the employment discrimination 
world, for the benefit of employers, of a difficult evidentiary thicket.27 
This is why I believe the Supreme Court oral argument is very impor-
tant for discerning how the case eventually came to be decided.28  In review-
ing the transcript of the oral argument,29 I noted in a contemporaneous blog 
post the tenor of Justice Scalia’s questions, and those of Justice Alito, and 
how they seemed to indicate that they were in favor of excluding such evi-
dence as per se irrelevant under Rule 401.30  Yet the United States, support-
ing Sprint, took the contextual approach to the issue and attacked the 
admission of the “me too” evidence instead under Rule 403.31  Eventually, 
Justices Scalia and Alito, along with Justices Breyer and Souter,32 came 
around and seemed satisfied with taking the “proper standard of review” 
 
26
  Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Dwindling Docket Mystifies the Supreme Court, NY TIMES, Dec 
7, 2006 at A1.  The Court could have issued its ruling in an unsigned order. See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (link); Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) 
(link). 
27
  Coyle, supra note 10 (“Employers predict juror confusion and prejudice, minitrials within trials, 
and lengthy and costly discovery,” if “me too” evidence is admissible in these cases); see also Michael 
Selmi, The Supreme Court’s 2006–2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet But Revealing Term, 11 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 219, 247 (2007) (stating, in reference to Davenport v. Washington Education 
Association, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007), and Beck v. Pace International Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007), that, 
“[g]iven the limited importance of these two cases, and the absence of any direct conflicts, it appears the 
Court may have taken the cases simply to correct erroneous lower court decisions, and thereby to de-
prive the unions of their victories.”). 
28
  I am not the first to recognize that the reading transcripts of Supreme Court arguments is an exer-
cise tantamount to reading tea leaves, but the comments made in the Mendelsohn oral argument were 
particularly telling in hindsight. 
29
  Transcript of Oral Argument, Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008) 
(No. 06–1221), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-
1221.pdf (link).  
30
  See Posting of Paul M. Secunda (Dec. 3, 2007), supra note 11 (“Justice Scalia . . . [thinks that] 
this type of evidence should be absolutely banned under 401, or the Court should rule that it would have 
been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have allowed this type of evidence in under 403.  Justice 
Alito appears to concur in this point . . . .  Justice Scalia clearly wants this to be an open and shut 401 
case, not dependent on 403: ‘[Referring to the facts of this case] It is hard to see what wouldn’t be mar-
ginally relevant if you think that’s marginally relevant.’”). 
31
  Id. (“The United States, supporting Sprint, takes the position that although this evidence is not 
always non-admissible, it was properly not admitted in this case. Although marginally relevant under 
401, the government attacks the case under 403.”). 
32
  Id. (“The otherwise Mendelsohn-supportive justices [Breyer and Souter] appear to believe that 
Scalia’s best point is that we should defer to the trial court absent an abuse of discretion.”). 
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approach.33  So, although the Supreme Court may have taken on the case 
with some justices hoping to banish “me too” evidence to the dustbin of 
employment-discrimination-law history, that oral argument led enough Jus-
tices to a consensus revolving around easily-applied and accepted standard 
of review principles championed by the Solicitor General. 
III. MENDELSOHN’S MEDICINE 
All of this finally leads me to the final misstep—the one that Professor 
Rubinstein made in interpreting this case to bode well for employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs in the future.  To be clear, I think he is right in his be-
lief that, at the very least, plaintiffs can use language from the opinion to 
say that such evidence is not completely barred from consideration.34  I also 
agree with him that, “the use of ‘me too’ evidence is likely to significantly 
increase as a result of the notoriety of the Mendelsohn decision and the in-
creasing importance of comparative-type evidence to employment discrimi-
nation litigation.”35 
But we part ways when he argues that the holding of the Court may al-
low facts as attenuated as Mendelsohn to be admitted under Rule 40336 and 
that the decision in the case will likely lead to more employment discrimi-
nation plaintiffs to win their cases.37  In this vein, Professor Rubinstein of-
fers this metaphor: “[T]his bit of dicta [about “me too” evidence not being 
per se inadmissible] provides plaintiffs with a shot of adrenalin that may, in 
some cases, cure the disease of employment discrimination.”38 
I think it is much more likely that on remand the Tenth Circuit in Men-
delsohn will remand and “suggest” that the district court actually explain it-
self, keeping in mind the Supreme Court’s admonition.  Moreover, I do not 
 
33
  Id. (“Justice Scalia seems to suggest that this case should be about the appropriate standard of re-
view for the appellate court: ‘If there’s any basis on which the district court’s decision would have been 
correct, the district court’s decision is upheld.’  Justice Alito follows this line later, implying that, if the 
Court found that the district court had not abused its discretion under F.R.E. 403, then the Court would 
uphold the district court’s refusal to admit the ‘me too’ evidence in question.”). 
34
  See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 267; Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140, 
1147 (2008) (“The question whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in an 
individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evi-
dence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.  Applying Rule 403 to determine if evi-
dence is prejudicial also requires a fact-intensive, context-specific inquiry.”). 
35
  Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 267. 
36
  See id. at 273. 
37
  See id. at 274 (“This Essay asserts . . . that Sprint will result in many more ‘me too’ types of 
comparative witness testimony being admitted into evidence.  As noted, this is mainly because, under 
facts so attenuated, the fact that such “me too” evidence was not inadmissible implies that it might be 
admissible.”). 
38
  See id. at 272–74. (“Even if Sprint is read in such a restrictive fashion, it is probably still going to 
wind up as important medicine to plaintiffs.  This is largely because many employment discrimination 
plaintiffs operate in an environment where so little medicine in the form of evidentiary proof is avail-
able.”). 
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think the trial court in this case is unusual in employing Rule 403 to exclude 
“me too” evidence from the record.  The future for this type of evidence is 
not entirely clear, but given the number of Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II 
nominees serving on the federal bench, it is more likely in the short-term 
that the exercise of their discretion under Rule 403 will lead to the exclu-
sion of “me too” evidence in many more cases than where it is let in.  Em-
ploying Professor Rubinstein’s metaphor again, this all seems more like a 
sedative for employment discrimination plaintiffs suffering chronic pain 
than it does a shot of adrenaline. 
CONCLUSION 
In the title of his Colloquy Essay, Professor Rubinstein makes refer-
ence to a claim that I previously made that Mendelsohn represents a “judi-
cial punt.”39  I still believe that.40  But to modify my point a tad, rather than 
this being a typical judicial punt to avoid having to deal with more difficult 
legal issues, this was an appropriate punt because somewhere along the line 
the Court recognized its misstep in granting certiorari in the first place.  It 
had to punt because such contextualized evidentiary rulings are almost al-
ways left to trial courts. 
As to whether Mendelsohn will go down as an important case, I do be-
lieve Professor Rubinstein is correct that plaintiffs and their attorneys will 
use the case for the proposition that such evidence cannot be absolutely 
barred.  That being said, I am less confident than Professor Rubinstein in 
believing that these resulting 403 balancings will, by and large, favor em-
ployees.  Because of the conservative nature of the present federal judiciary, 
I suspect that we will continue to see much of the same types of balancing 
we saw before Mendelsohn to exclude potentially relevant employment dis-
crimination evidence.41 
 
39
  Posting of Paul M. Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/02/me-too-adea-evi.html (Feb. 26, 2008) (“So 
the Supreme Court seems [to have] . . .  punted somewhat on the more difficult evidentiary issues dis-
cussed here and decided this case on the easiest possible basis: a lack of proper deferral by the 10th Cir-
cuit to the district court’s ambiguous conclusion.”) (link). 
40
  One of my colleagues has described it as perhaps being more like a situation when the referee 
picks up a flag after realizing there was actually no penalty. 
41
  Indeed, Professor Rubinstein already notes lower court cases since Mendelsohn that have bal-
anced plaintiff “me too” evidence right out of the case.  See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 274 n.55 (citing 
Sgro v. Bloomberg, Civ. No. 05-731, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27175 (D. N.J. Mar. 31, 2008); Opsatnik v. 
Northfolk Sourthern Corp., Civ. No. 06-81, 2008 U.S. Dist Lexis 26727 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2008)).  
Professor Rubinstein cites Elion v. Jackson, Civ. No. 05-0992, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27520 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 7, 2008), for a “me too” case where evidence was admitted, but it supported the employer’s claims.  
Id.  Elion gives further support to my view that conservative judges tend to come to employer-friendly 
outcomes as a result of the discretion they are given under Rule 403. 
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Finally, I disagree with Professor Rubinstein that we should desire 
clear legal rules in this area of the law42 or that the Supreme Court will seek 
to promulgate such rules in a future case.43  Leaving the last word to the 
Mendelsohn Court: “Relevance and prejudice under Rules 401 and 403 are 
determined in the context of the facts and arguments in a particular case, 
and thus are generally not amenable to broad per se rules.”44 
 
 
 
42
  See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 269 (“Unfortunately, the Court decided the case on procedural 
grounds, and as a result, the Court did not promulgate any clear legal rules.”). 
43
  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
44
  Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140, 1147 (2008). 
